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DAWN JOHNSEN

"TRAP"ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground
Alternative
A B S TRA CT. Public discourse over abortion overwhelmingly focuses on whether the Supreme
Court will overrule Roe v. Wade and states will again ban abortion. But at least since 1992, when
the Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey reaffirmed Roe's "central holding," certain moderatesounding abortion restrictions - sometimes framed as reasonable compromise regulations - have
posed a greater threat to women's reproductive health and liberty. This Essay examines one
increasingly popular form of restriction: laws that regulate providers of abortion services in the
name of advancing women's health, without actual health justification. Little-noted efforts to
enact such restrictions in Indiana, during the same period South Dakota made headlines
enacting criminal abortion bans in 2006 and 2008, illustrate the potential impact of what
opponents have called "TRAP laws," for targeted regulation of abortion providers. The burdens
that result from regulatory interference with the availability of services fall disproportionately on
the most vulnerable women: those unable to bear increased costs, travel longer distances, or
otherwise overcome government-created barriers to legal health services. The Indiana experience
also points to the importance and effectiveness of "common-ground" alternative approaches to
reducing the number of abortions. Through programs that prevent unintended pregnancy and
promote healthy childbearing, the government can more effectively reduce abortions while
respecting our nation's fundamental liberties and values.
A U T H O R. Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington. I am
grateful to Walter Dellinger and Reva Siegel for their counsel and inspiration, and to Eric Rey
and Terry Trapane for their outstanding research assistance.
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DUAL STRATEGIES FOR REVERSING ROE

The voters of South Dakota twice defeated ballot measures that sought to
criminalize the performance of abortions, first in 2006 and again in 2008.1 If
enacted, either version of the ban clearly would have violated the constitutional
right that the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized by a strong seven-Justice
majority in Roe v. Wade2 and that the Court continues to recognize more than
three decades later, albeit by a diminished margin.' Those who crafted the
ballot measures hoped that by the time the inevitable constitutional challenge
worked its way up to the Supreme Court, the Court's composition would have
changed sufficiently to uphold the law. Instead, the South Dakota electorate
defeated the bans and the nation elected a president, Barack Obama, whose
judicial appointees are likely to continue to support Roe. The 2008 election thus
reinforced the prevalent view that women's right to decide whether to continue
a pregnancy is essentially secure: the political system will defend the right from
serious infringement, and the Court will not overrule Roe.
A measure of complacency has prevailed among Roe's supporters since the
Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.4 By contrast, during the decade prior to Casey, abortion ranked high
among the issues that occupied law and politics. Two successive presidents,
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, were elected on platforms that called
for the appointment of Justices who would overrule Roe. By the time the Court
announced it would hear Casey, those two presidents had appointed five
Justices and elevated a sixth to Chief Justice, and the Court appeared to have
the votes to overrule Roe.

1.

H.R. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006 by voter referendum)

(exempting only abortions intended to "prevent the death of a pregnant mother"); Initiative
Petition: An Act To Protect the Lives of Unborn Children, and the Interests and Health of
Pregnant Mothers, by Prohibiting Abortions Except in Cases Where the Mother's Life or
Health Is at Risk, and in Cases of Rape and Incest (Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2oo8/2oo8regulateperforma
nceofabortions.pdf (exempting only abortions when necessary to prevent the death of a
pregnant woman; when a pregnancy poses "a serious risk of a substantial and irreversible
impairment of the functioning of a major bodily organ or system of the pregnant woman";
and, for rape and incest victims who reported the crime to the authorities, before the
completion of the twentieth week of pregnancy).
2.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

3.

See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).

4.

505 U.S. 833.
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The Casey Court defied expectations. To the great relief of some and the
bitter disappointment of others, the Court reaffirmed what it described as Roe's
central holding. In the process, the Justices offered their most fully developed
articulations to date of the nature of the right at stake and its centrality to
women's liberty and equality-the most striking of which came in a plurality
opinion jointly written by three Justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and
Bush. The unexpected nature of the ruling and the Court's eloquence
contributed to a sense of relief and victory among Roe supporters and
distracted attention from the fact that the Court, in some respects, had also
diminished Roe's protections.
In the post-Casey world, a reversal of Roe is not the only threat to
reproductive health and liberty. To be sure, public discourse over abortion has
continued to focus on Roe's formal status, but it has inadequately appreciated
the ways in which abortion restrictions already in place, or on the near horizon,
threaten to make abortion services unavailable to growing numbers of the most
vulnerable women. While South Dakota's high-profile, anti-Roe strategy has
floundered, an under-the-radar, ground-level strategy to restrict access to
abortion services has flourished.
Advocates of Roe's reversal have differed on how to accomplish their goal.
Some have supported the South Dakota approach of enacting outright criminal
bans, arguing that the Court (and most important, Justice Kennedy) might be
persuaded to change its position if the public case against Roe were reoriented
away from fetal protection and toward arguments that keeping abortion legal
harms women who have abortions.' The second and dominant anti-Roe
strategy recognizes that the success of criminal bans would seem to require

5.

See, e.g., Memorandum from Samuel B. Casey, Senior Counsel, Law of Life Project,
Christian Legal Soc'y & Harold J. Cassidy, Litig. Counsel on Law of Life Initiative, to
Members of the S.D. Pro-Life Leadership Coalition & Others 10, 12 (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Legal%2oMemo%2o&o/2OProposed%oSouth%2oDakota
%2oAbortion%2oBill%20(10-10-2007).pdf (noting that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion

in Gonzales v. Carhart indicates that he-along with Justice Roberts-"would be most
receptive to [a] women's interest analysis"); see also Carhart,550 U.S. at 159 (upholding the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, in part because although "no reliable data" exists,
the experience of an amicus curiae indicated that "some women come to regret their
choice"); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1788-9o (20o8) (discussing strategy memos in which
leaders of the anti-choice movement debated the kinds of abortion restrictions that would
promote or diminish the movement's influence on Justice Kennedy); id. at 1773 (concluding
that women's dignity is violated by abortion restrictions that purport to protect women but
in reality "reviv[e] forms of gender paternalism that the Court and the nation repudiated in
the 1970S").
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changing the Court's composition, 6 which is unlikely in the short run. It
therefore favors instead an incremental approach: the cumulative effect of legal
restrictions short of bans and extralegal pressures to restrict the provision of
legal abortion services and create "abortion free" states without
criminalization.'
Even prior to President Obama's election, the incremental approach was
prevalent. In a 2007 memorandum assessing "how best to advance the pro-life
cause at present,",8 long-time general counsel to the National Right to Life
Committee James Bopp commended "[a]stute pro-life leaders" for "rallying
pro-lifers around passing what restrictions were permissible": "clinic
regulations (which often shut down clinics), parental involvement, waiting
periods, and informed consent."9 He advised that "now is not the time to pass
...bills banning abortion" because "such an effort is presently doomed to
expensive failure" before the Court-a failure that would make a future
overruling of Roe even more difficult.'" Since the 2008 election, the consensus
behind the incremental strategy has understandably strengthened among
leading anti-Roe advocates, who have sought to convince their constituents, for
example, that incrementalism is both "ethical" and "effective,"" and that
"regulations which emphasize the risks to women and the need to protect
women (such as informed consent, abortion clinic regulations, etc.) will be
more effective means to curtail or overturn Roe than abortion prohibitions." 2

See, e.g., Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr., Member, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, &
Richard E. Coleson, Senior Assoc., Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, on Pro-Life Strategy Issues 3
(Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.personhood.net/docs/BoppMemorandumi.pdf [hereinafter
Bopp Memorandum].

6.

7. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Following the Beat of the Ban: After a Loss in South Dakota, Many in the

Anti-Abortion Movement Reassess Their Legal Strategy, A.B.A. J. Feb. 2007, at 32 (discussing
two competing approaches); Frontline: The Last Abortion Clinic (PBS television broadcast
Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/clinic/ (quoting the

president of Pro-Life Mississippi, which lobbies for abortion regulations and organizes
demonstrations at abortion clinics, as describing the organization's goal "to make
Mississippi the first abortion free state in the nation").
8.
9.

Bopp Memorandum, supra note 6, at i.
Id. at 5-6; see also Frontline: The Last Abortion Clinic, supra note 7.

io.Bopp Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.
11. Clarke D. Forsythe, Prudence in Policymaking: Is Incrementalism Ethical and Effective?, in
DEFENDING LIFE 2009: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR A PRo-LIFE AMERICA 75, 75 (Denise M.
Burke et al., eds.) (2009) [hereinafter DEFENDING LIFE 2009], available at
12.

136o

http://dl.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/DLo9--ALL.pdf.
Clarke D. Forsythe, The Road Map to Reversing Roe v. Wade, in DEFENDING LIFE 2009, supra
note ii, at 63, 6S. Forsythe further instructs that "[i]nterim and incremental reductions of
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To help explore some of the ramifications and lessons of abortion
restrictions short of direct bans, this Essay takes as its principal example efforts
to restrict access to abortion services in Indiana. In 2006, the year South
Dakotans first rejected an abortion ban, an Indiana legislator also introduced a
bill to outlaw abortion in most circumstances.13 That bill did not even progress
to the point of a hearing, but two moderate-sounding bills that would have
restricted the provision of abortion services came close to enactment. 14 One of
these bills is particularly worthy of study because, under the guise of healthrelated building standards, it would have ended the provision of abortion
services at every clinic operating in the state. The phrase "TRAP laws," which
is short for targeted regulation of abortion providers, is sometimes used to
describe such regulations by those who oppose them."5 Indiana abortion
providers, like those throughout the country, continue to confront these and
other restrictions in the state legislature and-beginning in 2008-in county
commissions as well, in what the president of Indiana Right to Life described
as "a new strategy" to work at the county level. 6
Abortion, of course, has proven to be an issue of enduring public
controversy and difficulty. Most Americans would welcome a workable
compromise that maintains Roe's core protections while reducing the number8
of abortions, 17 and the 2008 election may bring some progress on that front.

Roe (and the abortion license) are necessary to pave the way to a complete overruling." Id. at
64.
lO96, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 20o6), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/IN/lNlo96.1.html.
14. H.R. 1172, 11
4 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.2006) (as passed by Indiana House, Feb.
1, 20o6), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HB1l72.3.html; H.R.
io8o, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 20o6) (as passed by Indiana House, Feb. 1,
2oo6), availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HBlo8o.l.html.
15.
See, e.g., NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, THE TRAP: TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION
PROVIDERS (2007), available at http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/
downloads/about abortiorVtrap-laws.pdf; cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and
Administrative Regulation, S6 EMORY L.J. 865, 870-75 (2007) (discussing the increase in the
number of TRAP laws after Casey and the courts' treatment of these regulations); Amalia
W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion Providers: A New
ConstitutionalStrategy, 1O5 COLUM. L. REv. 1563, 1563-71 (2005) (discussing the development
of TRAP laws -specifically, those that permit state health departments to conduct
unannounced warrantless inspections).
16. Judy Keen, County Abortion Regulations Scrutinized in Indiana:Rules PresentNew Obstaclefor
Providers, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2008, at Ai.
17. See,
e.g.,
Gallup,
Gallup's
Pulse
of
Democracy:
Abortion,
http://www.gallup.com/poIl/1576/Abortion.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009).
13.

H.R.
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The particulars, however, matter tremendously. As recent Indiana events help
to demonstrate, abortion restrictions crafted to sound reasonable and to appeal
to moderate legislators who would not support outlawing abortion can
operate, in practice, to make abortion unavailable, even while the Court
continues to reaffirm Roe and protect the right from direct attacks. Abortion
restrictions can impose burdens not apparent on their face, especially on the
most vulnerable women-those who, because of their life circumstances, are
most unable to bear increased costs, travel additional distances, or otherwise
overcome government-imposed barriers to abortion.
Part I of this Essay describes the legal restrictions in effect in Indiana and
throughout the nation as a backdrop for Part II's examination of the initiatives
proposed during the 20o6 legislative session. The surprising role that abortion
opponents played in stopping this legislation is the subject of Part III. Part IV
examines one lesson that can be taken from the Indiana experience: though
their effects may be difficult to predict or measure, politically appealing
"compromise" restrictions can harm women's health and undermine our
nation's commitment to liberty and equality. This Essay concludes by
suggesting a second lesson: the superiority of "common-ground" approaches
that promise greater success in reducing the number of abortions while
affirming our nation's fundamental values.
I.

ABORTION RESTRICTIONS

IN

INDIANA

Ever since Roe prevented states from imposing criminal prohibitions on the
performance of abortions prior to the point of fetal viability, states have
enacted a wide range of statutes that have restricted the provision of abortion
services in other ways. During the two decades between Roe and Casey (1973 to
1992), federal courts invalidated, under a "strict scrutiny" standard, several
kinds of state restrictions. 9 The Court's decision in Casey is best known for its
reaffirmation of Roe's "central holding,"2" but it also substituted a less

18.

See, e.g., Jacqueline L. Salmon, Some Abortion Foes Shifting Focus from Ban to Reduction,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2008, at Ai (reporting on a coalition of abortion opponents who seek

to reduce the number of abortions through social service programs and other assistance to
support women and children, rather than through abortion restrictions); id. (noting that
"during the campaign, [now-President Barack Obama] spoke of wanting to reduce
abortions and of finding 'common ground' in the debate").
ig.

See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986);
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

2o. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
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protective "undue burden" review standard for Roe's traditional and more
predictable "strict scrutiny" of abortion restrictions." The Court's articulation
and application of the undue burden standard in Casey promised more
protection than has since been provided in some later applications. Casey itself,
however, signaled that the new standard would be less protective than Roe's by
upholding restrictions that the Court had invalidated in two earlier decisions
22
under strict scrutiny.
Indiana has adopted almost all of the abortion restrictions the courts have
upheld. Prior to Casey, Indiana enacted the two significant types of restrictions
the Court had found survived Roe. First, Indiana prohibited women enrolled in
Medicaid from receiving abortion services through that program with only
minor exceptions ;23 currently, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia

21.

22.

23.

See id. at 876-88 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.). An abortion restriction
is an "undue burden" and unconstitutional if its "purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at
878. The Casey Court also declared, "[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child." Id. at 846 (majority opinion). Three Justices opined that "[r]egulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not
constitute an undue burden." Id. at 878 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.);
see also Forsythe, supra note 12, at 73 n.33 (stating that "[b]y its inherent elasticity and
subjectivity, the 'undue burden' standard is susceptible to 'evolution' and it could evolve in a
new way that would be deferential toward state regulation or prohibition"). This Essay
considers the policy implications of certain abortion restrictions and not their
constitutionality, which courts would assess by applying Casey's undue burden standard.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.) (overruling in
part Akron, 462 U.S. 416, and Thornburgh,476 U.S. 747).
Like most states, the Indiana legislature elected to fund only those circumstances covered by
the Federal Medicaid program. IND. CODE § 16-10-3-3 (1992), repealed and reenacted by Act of
Apr. 30, 1993, § 17, 1993 Ind. Acts 2, 568 (codified at IND. CODE § 16-34-1-2 (2004))
(exempting from the funding ban abortions "necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant
woman"), invalidated by Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003);
405 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-28-7 (2008) (exempting "other circumstances if the abortion is
required to be covered by Medicaid under federal law"); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 315 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which restricted Medicaid funding to
only abortions necessary to save the life of the pregnant women or those resulting from rape
or incest, finding that it "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who
chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of
abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public
interest"). In 2003, the Indiana Supreme Court found the state funding scheme, which
covered abortion services only in cases of life endangerment, rape, and incest, violated the
Indiana Constitution's Equal Privileges and Immunities Clauses when applied to women in
some cases of extreme medical need:
[S]o long as the Indiana Medicaid program pays for abortions to preserve the
lives of pregnant women and where pregnancies are caused by rape or incest, it
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(as well as the federal government) impose similar funding limitations.2 4
Indiana also required girls under eighteen to obtain the consent of a parent
before having an abortion;25 thirty-four states currently require some form of
parental involvement (typically the consent of a parent). 6
After Casey, the Indiana legislature added new abortion restrictions,
consistent with the national trend. In 1995, Indiana enacted a mandatory
waiting-period statute. Under the statute, abortion providers must relate, in
person, certain mandatory information to a woman seeking to terminate a
pregnancy, including that state funds are available for prenatal care, that
adoption services are available, that an ultrasound is available, and that the
man responsible for the pregnancy is liable for child support. The woman must
then wait at least eighteen hours after receiving this information before she can

must also pay for abortions for Medicaid-eligible women whose pregnancies
create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function.
Humphreys, 796 N.E.2d at 26o.
See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS 2

24.

available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-OAL.pdf; Mailee R.
Smith, Abortion: A Survey ofFederaland State Law, in DEFENDING LIFE 2009, supra note ii, at
(2009),
113, 115.

§

25.

IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (1992), repealed and reenacted by Act of Apr. 30, 1993,
Acts at 571-72 (codified at IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4 (2004)). If the minor objects

17, 1993 Ind.
or is unable to
obtain consent from a parent or legal guardian, then the minor may petition the juvenile
court for a waiver of the consent requirement. IND. CODE § 16- 34 -2-4 (b) (2004). The judge
may grant the petition if the judge finds the minor to "be mature enough to make the
decision" or that the "abortion would be in the minor's best interests." Id. § 16-34-2-4(d);
see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (vacating a
district court's injunction of New Hampshire's parental consent law and remanding for a
determination of whether a narrower remedy was possible); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990) (finding Minnesota's statute that required that both parents be notified of a
minor's abortion to be unconstitutional, but the judicial bypass for parental consent
constitutional); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that required one parent's consent before a minor
could obtain an abortion and that contained a judicial bypass); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (finding an Ohio parental consent statute
unconstitutional in part because it did not provide a judicial bypass); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding Missouri's blanket parental consent
requirement to be unconstitutional); Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson,
716 F.2d 1127 (7 th Cir. 1983) (finding an earlier Indiana parental notification law
unconstitutional on various grounds later rectified by the legislature).

26.

See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 24, at 3 (reporting that thirty-four states require some
form of parental consent or notification and Oklahoma and Utah require both); Smith,
supra note 24, at 114 (reporting that thirty-six state parental involvement laws are in effect).
The discrepancy between these two figures is because the Guttmacher Institute reported the
number of states and Smith reported the number of statutes.
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obtain an abortion.27 Twenty-four states enforce mandatory information and
waiting periods (most often twenty-four hours),2" which typically prove most
burdensome for women who live long distances from the nearest provider and
have difficulty affording or otherwise arranging the second trip that the
waiting period may necessitate. In 1997, Indiana enacted a ban on the
performance of abortions using procedures described as "partial birth"; 9
fifteen states and the federal government currently have some version of this
ban.3" Additionally, a 1999 Indiana statute prohibited the director and all
employees of the Indiana Office of Women's Health from "advocat[ing],
promot[ing], refer[ring] to, or otherwise advanc[ing] abortion or
abortifacients"3'-a variation on the "gag rule" on abortion counseling the
3
Court upheld by a five-four vote in Rust v. Sullivan.
The impact of Indiana's legal restrictions can best be understood against
the backdrop of nonstatutory impediments to abortion services. Like many
states, Indiana suffers from a shortage of providers, and those providers face
picketing, hostility, and sometimes even violence. 33 The state's nine clinics are
located in just five of the state's ninety-two counties; 95% of Indiana counties,

27.

IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1); see A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman,
132 F. Supp. 2d 115o, 1151 (S.D. Ind. 2OOl) (enjoining the enforcement of the "'in the

presence' requirement" because it constituted an undue burden), rev'd, 305 F. 3 d 684, 693
(7 th Cir. 2002) (finding that the district court judge abused his discretion by "issu[ing] a
pre-enforcement injunction while the effects of the law (and reasons for those effects) are
open to debate").
supra note 24, at 3; Smith, supra note 24, at 114.

28.

GUTTMACHER INST.,

29.

IND. CODE

3o.

GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: BANS ON "PARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION 1
(2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.conVstatecenter/spibs/spibBPBA.pdf; Smith,

§

16- 34 -2-1(b).

supra note 24, at 115.
31.
32.

33.

§ 16-19-13-3.
500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding the federal government's policy against abortion counseling
despite claims that the policy was an impermissible construction of Title X, that it violated
the Fifth Amendment due process rights of the woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy,
and that it violated the First Amendment free speech rights of patients, physicians, and
staff).
See, e.g., Cathy Kightlinger, Fires Set in Abortion Clinic, Police Say, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept.
7, 2003, at B2 (reporting arson that caused damage to an abortion facility); see also NAT'L
IND. CODE

ABORTION FED'N, NAF VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION STATISTICS: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE &

available at
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/downloads/about -abrtion/violence
_statistics.pdf (reporting violence in the United States and Canada, which since 1993 has
included hundreds of violent acts, including seven murders and thousands of disruptive acts
such as bomb threats and clinic blockades).
DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS IN THE U.S. & CANADA (20o8),
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including nine metropolitan areas, lack any abortion provider. 4 The shortage
is particularly acute in the southern half of Indiana, where only one clinic
provides abortion services.3" This shortage mirrors a national trend, underway
since the early 198os, of steadily decreasing numbers of abortion providers. 6
II. INDIANA'S

2006

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

From 2006 to 2008, while the nation watched South Dakota consider and
reject two abortion bans, the Indiana legislature attracted a small measure of its
own national attention for seriously contemplating new forms of abortion
restrictions. In 2006, for the first time in years, an Indiana legislator introduced
a bill to outlaw abortion. House Bill lo96, introduced by Indiana
Representative Troy Woodruff, sought to impose criminal penalties of up to
eight years on anyone who performed an abortion, with exceptions only for the
performance of abortions necessary to save a woman's life or to prevent the
permanent impairment of her health.37
This proposed ban revealed the same strategy split among abortion
opponents at the state level as existed among national anti-choice advocates.
Representative Woodruff defended his bill on the ground that the newly
constituted Supreme Court might decide the issue differently than the Roe

34.

GUTTMACHER INST.,

STATE

FACTS ABOUT ABORTION:

INDIANA 2 (20o8), available at

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/indiana.pdf;
Abortion
Clinic
Licensing
Program, Indiana State Department of Health, Directory of Licensed Abortion Clinics,
http://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Abortion-Directory.pdf (last visited May 6, 2009) (listing
nine licensed abortion clinics in five counties).
3s.

Abortion Clinic Licensing Program, supra note 34; Ken Kusmer, Abortion Foes Shift
Restriction Push to Counties, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Aug. 15, 20o8, at C4 ("Indiana
has nine [clinics] in all, but none south of Bloomington.").

36.

See STANLEY K. HENSHAW & KATHRYN KOST, GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN OBTAINING ABORTIONS, 1974 TO 2004, at 26-27 (20o8),

available

at

http ://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2oo8/09/23/TrendsWomenAbortions-

wTables.pdf (reporting numbers of abortion providers by year from 1973 to 2005);
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States
in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10-11 (2003) (reporting that, in 2000,
87% of U.S. counties did not have an abortion provider and more than 90% of counties in

the Midwest did not have an abortion provider); Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the
United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH
6, 12, 14 (2008) (reporting statistics on the number of abortion providers and how far

women must travel to the nearest provider).
37.

H.R.

1o96,

114 th

Gen.

Assem.,

2d

Reg.

Sess.

http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/IN/INlo96.1.html.
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Court did in 1973.38 Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels, on the other hand,
questioned the wisdom of devoting time and money to the bill given its "very
limited prospect of ultimate success": "Ultimately for this to change, first the
heart of the country -and maybe ultimately the view the courts take of states'
rights to place some limits on abortion-would have to evolve."3 9 Indiana
Senate President Pro Tempore Robert Garton also objected, "Why would
someone want to deliberately run up court costs?" 4 ° This bill did not progress
in the legislature.
Abortion opponents were more unified (though, in the end, not entirely so)
in their support of two other bills that, instead of criminalizing abortion,
sought to impose new restrictions. 41 House Bill 1172 would have added more
specifics to the mandatory information that Indiana. already required
physicians to give patients at least eighteen hours before performing an
abortion, including a new requirement that physicians notify women in writing
42
that "human life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.
South Dakota was the only state that required a similar statement to be made
to all women seeking an abortion, and there it was clearly part of the state
legislature's broader effort to restrict abortion. 43 House Bill 1172 also would

38.

Mary Beth Schneider & Michele McNeil, Lawmaker's Long Shot: Overturn Roe v. Wade,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 6, 2006, at Ai.

39. Id.
40.

Id.

41.

In its reaction to the defeat of House Bill lO96, Planned Parenthood of Indiana shifted its
focus to two other anti-choice bills, as House Bill lO96's "spirit and intent were amended
into" House Bills io8o and 1172. Planned Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, 2006 Indiana
Legislation, http://advocates.ppin.org/2oo6jlegislation.aspx#hblo96 (last visited May 6,
2009).

42.

H.R. 1172, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess.'(Ind. 2006) (as passed by Indiana House, Feb.
1, 20o6), availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HB1172.3.html.

43.

See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3 4 -2 3 A-lo.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2008) (requiring physicians to give
women seeking an abortion a document stating "[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being"). The Casey joint opinion instructed that
states may require physicians to pass on to women state-dictated information, including
information that "expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion," but the information
must have the purpose of "ensuring a decision that is mature and informed." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, JJ.). Accordingly, the Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute's
requirement that a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy be provided information
about "fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the
pregnancy to full term." Id. A federal district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining
the South Dakota statute: "Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal
information doctors were required to disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires
abortion doctors to enunciate the State's viewpoint on an unsettled medical, philosophical,
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have required physicians to tell women that the fetus might experience pain
but that it was not medically possible to administer an anesthetic to the fetus
before twenty weeks of pregnancy. 4" Three other states required a similar
statement, but only for women past twenty weeks in their pregnancy. 4s Because
the Indiana bill did not limit the requirement to a specified gestational period
later in pregnancy, it received national press coverage for being "one of the
furthest-reaching abortion consent laws in the country.'' 46 As the legal director
of Americans United for Life stated, the enactment of House Bill 1172 "would
'47
put Indiana on the cutting edge of an emerging issue.
Proponents of the bill offered a few different public justifications. A
National Right to Life Committee spokesperson said it would provide women
with valuable information about the consequences of abortion. 48 An Indiana
Right to Life lobbyist similarly said that it was important that women know
that the procedure might cause the fetus pain.49 An Indiana Representative
who supported the bill said the purpose was to discourage abortion: "Given we
can't affect Roe versus Wade, this is an effort to try to reduce the number of
abortions, which we can do."" The substance of the message the bill sought to
mandate is, of course, highly debated and disputed. Its opponents argued that
it was not based in medical fact and would not give women true risk and

theological, and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus is a human being." Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated,
530 F. 3d 724 (8th Cit. 2008). The Eighth Circuit, however, vacated the preliminary
injunction, holding that Planned Parenthood could not establish that it would likely prevail
on the merits of its claim that the statute constituted an undue burden. Rounds, 530 F.3d at
736. Robert Post has cautioned that the Eighth Circuit's reasoning may be extended to allow
states to require physicians to provide information on other subjects that is contrary to the
majority or dominant beliefs of the medical profession. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939,
976-77, 988.

44. Ind. H.R. 1172.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2006);
MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(a)(1)(iv) (Supp. 2008).
46. Expansion Sought on Abortion Consent Laws, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2006, at A31; see Deanna
Martin, Abortion ConsentLaw Before Ind. Legislature: Doctor Would Say Conception Begins Life,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Aio.
47. Greg Hafkin, State Abortion Bill Has Few Models: Informed-Consent Measure Is Stricter than
Most, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 29, 2006, at Bi.
48. See Martin, supra note 46.
49. See Michele McNeil, Senate Panel OverhaulsAbortion Legislation: Effort To Limit Procedure Is
Severely Weakened, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
so. Greg Hafkin, Abortion Bill Defines Start of Life: Conception Is It, Doctors Would Have To Tell
Women, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 27, 2006, at Al.
45.
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benefit information; rather, the bill was a politically motivated attempt to use
misinformation to dissuade women from having abortions."'
House Bill io8o, the second and by far more significant abortion-related
bill that the Indiana legislature seriously considered in 2006, falls squarely
within any definition of a TRAP bill: as passed by the House, it targeted
abortion providers with onerous regulations that were not supported by health
or safety needs. 2 House Bill io8o had its genesis in an Indiana bill enacted the
previous year, Senate Bill 568, which directed the Indiana State Department of
Health to promulgate rules regarding the licensing and inspection of abortion
clinics and birthing centers.5 3 Senate Bill 568 itself was unusual and
controversial because it, too, targeted providers of abortion services for
4
regulations that were not imposed on comparable health care providers.1
Abortion providers unsuccessfully opposed the law, emphasizing their high
safety rates and the lack of evidence of a problem that would warrant singling
out abortion clinics for special regulation.5 Governor Mitch Daniels signed the
57
bill into law 56 after it passed both the Senate and the House overwhelmingly.
Pursuant to that law, the Indiana Department of Health promulgated over
thirty pages of regulatory standards for clinics that provide abortion services. s8
Of critical importance to the clinics, the regulations included a grandfather
clause that exempted clinics already in operation as of July 1,2006 from the

See Martin, supra note 46; State Abortion Proposal Defines Life as Beginning at Conception,
HERALD-TmES (Bloomington, Ind.), Feb. 12, 2006, at A12 (quoting Representative John
Ulmer, a Republican who voted against House Bill 1172, as saying, "[t]o put our religious
...beliefs into a statute that's going to be law, without being able to back it up scientifically,
I have real hard questions about doing that").
52. See H.R. io8o, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as passed by Indiana House,
Feb. 1,20o6), availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HBio8o.1.html.
53. S. 568, 114th Gen. Assem., xstReg. Sess. -(Ind. 2005) (to be codified at IND. CODE
51.

16-21-2-2.5).

54. See, e.g., Greg Hafkin, Abortion Clinics May Have To Close: Providers Say State Bill Regulating
Facilities, With No 'Grandfather'Clause, Leaves No Time To Comply, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb.
3, 2006, at Bi (discussing how for over thirty years abortion facilities had not been subjected
to individualized regulation by the state and the controversial nature of the new regulatory
efforts).

ss. See id. (discussing opponents' criticism that comparable legislation does not exist for
podiatrists and plastic surgeons, for example, and that there is no evidence that the new
requirements will improve abortion safety).
56. J. SENATE, 114th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 1914 (Ind. 2005).
57.

J. SENATE, 114th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 1014 (Ind. 2oo5) (unanimous); J. HouSE, 11
4 th
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 1037-38 (Ind. 2005) (passing by a vote of seventy-five to
eighteen).

58. See 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-17-2(0 (2008).
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"specifications of physical plant" sectionS9 : only clinics opened after the
effective date would be required to comply with the very detailed physical
structure and design requirements, which, for example, dictated sizes, types,
and numbers of rooms, hallways, and furnishings. 6' Grandfather clauses are
often included when new physical structure requirements are imposed on
health care providers, who otherwise might find it extremely burdensome to
comply with the new regulations after their facilities were already constructed
and their operations up and running. 6' Indiana Right to Life had lobbied the
Department of Health to make the new physical structure provisions applicable
to existing clinics, 62 but its efforts proved unsuccessful and the Department of
Health included the grandfather clause.
A few months later, House Bill io8o reignited the controversy. 63 As
introduced by Representative Marlin Stutzman in the 2006 session, it sought
to amend Indiana's existing abortion consent law to mandate additional
descriptions of the physical risks of abortion and the availability of adoption as
an alternative.64 The bill underwent extensive changes in the House

s9. Id.

6o. For example, the regulations required procedure rooms with a minimum of 12o square feet
if "local analgesia or nitrous oxide" were required, 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-1 7 -2(d)(1)(A),
"[a] separate recovery room or area ... [with] [a] minimum clear area of two (2) feet, six
(6) inches around three (3) sides of each recovery cart or lounge chair," 410 IND. ADMIN.
CODE 26-1 7 -2(d)( 4 )(A), and a "minimum corridor width [of] forty-four (44) inches," 410
IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-17-2(e) (5).
61.
When the Facility Guidelines Institute and American Institute of Architects promulgate new
design and construction guidelines for health care facilities, the physical plant guidelines are
to apply only to newly constructed or renovated facilities-not to existing facilities. See
FACILITY GUIDELINES INST. & AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, GUIDELINES FOR DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH CARE FACILITIES § 5.2.1 (2006) (listing design requirements for
outpatient facilities, including corridor width, ceiling height, and boiler room
specifications); id. § 3 (applying the guidelines when "renovation or replacement work is
done to an existing facility" and to "all new work or additions"); id. § 3.2 (applying new
physical plant guidelines to "only that portion of the total facility affected by the
[renovation] project"). These guidelines are used by over forty states to "regulate new
health facility construction and health care renovation." Press Release, Facility Guidelines
Inst., Comment Period Open for Health Care Design and Construction Guidelines 2 (Aug.
http://www.fgiguidelines.org/pdfs/
25,
2008),
available
at
2oloGuidelinescomment-period.pdf. In addition, the federal government references the
Guidelines when regulating several of its programs. Id.
62. See Planned Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, supra note 41.
63. See H.R. lo8o, 1l4 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as introduced, Jan. 5, 20o6),
available at http://www.in.govAegislative/bills/2oo6/IN/INlo8o.l.html.
64.

Id.
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Committee on Public Policy and Veterans Affairs,6" however, and passed the
House, sixty to thirty-eight.66 As amended and passed, House Bill 1o8o would
have codified the physical structure and design regulations originally
promulgated by the Department of Health-but without the critical
grandfather clause." 7 Thus, this version of the bill would have made the
Department of Health regulations mandatory for all clinics -effectively
shutting down all of Indiana's existing abortion clinics without directly
banning abortion.6 s
Providers of abortion services and supportive legislators and advocates
worked hard to explain to the legislature and the press the real expected impact
of the relatively innocuous-sounding provisions of House Bill io8o. According
to testimony presented at hearings and other reports of providers of abortion
services, its enactment would have shut down all nine health care clinics in
Indiana that provided abortion services.6 q Compliance with the requirements
would have required multimillion dollar renovations that, even if affordable,
would have taken more time than the legislation would have given clinics to
comply.70 The director of the Women's Pavilion in South Bend, for example,
expressed concern that the way her clinic housed its heating, air conditioning,
hot water, mechanical, and electrical equipment did not comply with House
Bill io8o's requirement that all such equipment be housed in an "equipment

Compare id., with H.R. io8o, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as reported by
the Ind. H. Comm. on Pub. Policy & Veterans Affairs, Jan. 26, 20o6), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bilIs/2oo6/PDF/HCRP/AMlo8oo2.ooi.pdf.
66.. SeeJ. HOUSE, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 489 (Ind.2006).
67. Compare 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-17-2 (20o8), with H.R. io8o, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as passed by Indiana House, Feb. 1, 20o6), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HBio8o.1.html.
68. Planned Parenthood of Indiana compared the effect of House Bill lo8o to that of a criminal
ban: "While Indiana may yet become the first state in the union to end access to abortion
without making it illegal, the South Dakota and Mississippi laws have been passed to serve
as direct challenges to Roe v. Wade (much like HB 1o96 was introduced here)." Planned
Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, Legislative Wrap-Up, http://advocates.ppin.org/other
newS-20o6.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009).
69. See Hafkin, supra note 54 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Indiana's director of legislative
affairs, who stated that "[n]o provider currently meets [House Bill 1o8o's] standard[s], and
the amount of time and resources it takes to renovate the facilities could take years and cost
millions of dollars"); Betty Cockrum, President, Planned Parenthood of Ind., Statement to
the Senate Health and Provider Services Committee (Feb. 22, 2006) (on file with author).

65.

70.

See Hafkin, supra note S4.
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room."7 The Fort Wayne Women's Health Organization, the sole provider of
abortion services in Fort Wayne, complained that it would have also failed the
bill's requirements, because it did not have a "housekeeping room." 72 The
Planned Parenthood clinic located in Bloomington, the only clinic that provides
abortion services in all of southern Indiana,73 is a multifloor facility located near
the center of town that could not have expanded to meet the bill's square74
footage requirements at its current location due to insufficient available land.
The clinics also highlighted the absence of any health, safety, or other rationale
7
that justified the alterations the bill would have required. 1
The prospects for enactment of both House Bill io8o and House Bill 1172
seemed strong at the outset. The Indiana House passed both bills by wide
margins: House Bill 1172 by a vote of seventy to thirty76 and House Bill 1o8o by
a vote of sixty to thirty-eight.77 The Indiana Senate Health and Provider
Services Committee, however, amended both bills in ways that substantially
diminished their impact, and the Senate passed the amended versions."8 In the
end, both bills died when the 2006 legislative session ended sine die without

71.

Id. The director of the clinic also said of the bill, "I've fought so many battles for so many
years. When you've had to worry about people shooting your windows out and harassing
you and death threats, [House Bill io8o is] just one more thing." Id.

72.

Id. A "housekeeping room" must include "a service sink" and "adequate storage for
housekeeping supplies and equipment." Ind. H.R. io8o (as passed by Indiana House, Feb.

73.

See Kusmer, supra note 35 ("Indiana has nine [clinics] in all, but none south of
Bloomington."); Abortion Clinic Licensing Program, supra note 34.

1, 2006).

74. Cockrum, supra note 69.
75.

See id.; Hafkin, supra note 54 (quoting the medical director of the Fort Wayne clinic as
saying, "If we had a bad track record, I'd be the first one to understand it. But we don't");
Letter from Vicki Saporta, President & CEO, Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, to Senator Patricia
Miller, Ind. Senate (Feb. 8, 2006) (on file with author); see also IND. STATE DEP'T OF
HEALTH, INDIANA MEDICAL ERROR REPORTING SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT FOR 2006, at 23
(2007), available at http://www.in.gov/isdh/fles/FinalReport2oo6.pdf (tabulating all

76.

medical errors reported, as required by Indiana state law, and reporting that no medical
errors were reported in any of Indiana's nine licensed abortion-services providers); Amanda
lacone, Doctor Law Would Cover Only Abortion, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Sept. 6,
20o8, at At ("[N]o one has died from abortion complications in Indiana since 1978, when a
teenage girl had a back-alley abortion and didn't want to tell her parents when she had
problems ....
");Planned Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, supra note 41 (reporting a
complication rate of less than half of one percent for first trimester abortions across all
Indiana clinics at the time House Bill io8o was being considered).
J. HousE, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 491 (Ind. 2006).

-r7.

Id. at 489.

78.

J. SENATE, 11
4 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 671-72 (Ind.2006) (passing House Bill 1O8O as
amended); id.
at 711 (passing House Bill 1172 as amended).
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resolution of the differences between the House and Senate versions of the
bills.79
I. OPPOSITION FROM UNUSUAL SOURCES

Among the most interesting factors behind the failure of the legislation that
would have used clinic regulations to close all of Indiana's existing clinics was
the principled opposition of some who were known for their opposition to
abortion and Roe. 80 Democratic Representative Peggy Welch provided a strong
and persuasive voice in the House against House Bill 1o8o. Welch, a nurse at
Bloomington Hospital, 8' strongly opposed abortion.82 She had supported the
2005 legislation that directed the development of the new regulations for
abortion clinics that would become the basis for House Bill 1o8o. 83 Welch
explained that the purpose of the earlier legislation was not to close clinics, but
to ensure the safety of women undergoing abortions.8 4 In response to House
Bill lo8o, Welch confirmed that she would "like to see abortion clinics closed,"
but said that it was wrong for anti-choice advocates to seek to do so by
removing the grandfather clause in the clinic regulations.8" Welch gave an
impassioned plea against the bill, refuting Indiana Right to Life's claim that the
bill was meant to protect women and stating instead that "with this new bill, it

79. Michele McNeil & Bill Ruthhart, Credit, Deduction Will Offset Property Taxes - Legislature
Approves Reductionsfor 2006-07, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 15, 2006, at Ail.

H.RI
io8o,
They
Vote?:
Did
Life,
How
Right
to
Indiana
80. See
http://www.indianalife.org/htm/bills/billsleg.asp?billid=87 (last visited May 6, 2009)
(describing votes on House Bill lo8o); Indiana Right to Life, How Did They Vote?: H.R.
1172, http://www.indianalife.org/html/bills/billsleg.asp?billid=85 (last visited May 6, 2009)
(describing votes on House Bill 1172).
si. Peggy Welch's Resume, http://www.peggywelch.coni/about.html (last visited May 6,
2009).

See Legislaturein Brief,INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 2, 20o6, at B2; see also Indiana Right to Life,
Peggy Welch, http://www.indianalife.org/html/bills/
How Did They Vote?:
legbills.asp?legid=96&Submit=Search (last visited May 6, 2009) (describing Welch as
voting "pro-life" 85% of the time).
83. See Legislaturein Brief,supra note 82.
84. Dann Denny, Welch Joins Abortion-Rights Advocates in Decrying Legislation, HERALD-TIMES
(Bloomington, Ind.), Feb. 11, 2006, at Ai; see also David Swindle, State Legislation Could
Close Abortion Clinics Throughout Indiana, BALL ST. DAILY NEWS (Muncie, Ind.), Feb. 22,
20o6, at 4 ("As much as I would like to see clinics close, it was not my goal to use a clinicregulation bill to do that.").
82.

85. Denny, supra note 84.
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appears the goal is to shut down the clinics., 86 Given her prior assurances
about the purpose behind the 2005 law and implementing regulations, Welch
said of House Bill io8o, "I can't support it. It's a matter of personal integrity
and honoring my word."8 7 She also cited the certainty of a lawsuit, which she
said might derail any attempts to regulate clinics.88
Even more central to the defeat of House Bill io8o was the position taken
in the Senate by the Republican chair of the Senate Health and Provider
Services Committee, Patricia Miller. Miller made such substantial changes to
both House Bill io8o and House Bill 1172 that the Indianapolis Star reported
that this "staunch opponent of abortion" had "gutted" the bills, giving "a boost
to abortion rights supporters. '' 89 The Senate version of House Bill io8o
substituted more generalized safety standards for the rigid physical building
requirements that no existing Indiana abortion provider would have
satisfied. 9° And instead of requiring physicians to tell women that life begins at
conception and that fetuses might experience pain during abortion, the Senate
version of House Bill 1172 would have required physicians only to tell women
that there were families waiting and willing to adopt children and that the

86.

Id.

87.

Id.
Hafkin, supra note 54 ("Passing the bill and not grandfathering existing facilities would
essentially derail any effort by the state to regulate abortion clinics because of the certainty
of a lawsuit, Welch said.").

88.

89. McNeil, supra note 49.

go. In place of the House's particularized physical and design requirements, see H.R. io8o, 114th
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.2006) (as passed by Indiana House, Feb. 1, 20o6), available
at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/HB/HBio8o.i.html, the Senate inserted the
following more generic requirements:
(1)Be constructed, arranged, modified, or maintained to ensure the safety and
well being of patients, employees, and visitors to the clinic.
(2) Provide a physical plant and equipment that meet state fire prevention and
building safety codes or rules established by the fire prevention and building
safety commission or the state department.

(3)Provide a safe and healthy environment that minimizes infection exposure
and risk to patients, employees, and visitors to the clinic.
H.R. lo8o, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.2006) (as passed by Indiana Senate, Feb.
28, 2006), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/EH/EHio8o.1.html. The

Senate version retained the House version's requirement of at least one annual inspection by
the Indiana State Department of Health. Id. A conference committee was appointed to

reconcile the two versions of the legislation. J.HOUSE, 11
4th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 774
(Ind.20o6); J. SENATE, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 779 (Ind. 20o6). The conference

committee, however, did not issue a report prior to the end of the session. See J.
114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.20o6).
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abortion procedure does have physical risks.9 1 The Senate ultimately passed
Miller's substitute versions of both bills by the same overwhelming vote of
forty-eight to one. 92
Miller, like Welch, was a longtime abortion opponent. 93 Miller explained
that she was "still very pro-life" but that "she didn't think the bills
appropriately addressed the larger issue of reducing the number of abortions in
Indiana. '94 Miller particularly favored efforts to reduce the number of
abortions by encouraging women to put their babies up for adoption. 9 The
Indianapolis Star reported that Miller described her position in very personal
terms and that her voice cracked as she tearfully explained: "I'd have two less
96
grandchildren," because two of her four grandchildren had been adopted.
Miller continued, "I think we ought to do more to honor women that make
that courageous decision."9 7
Also striking was the opposition to both bills by the self-described
antiabortion editorial board of the Indianapolis Star, which characterized the
bills as "stray[ing] from good public policy into government meddling.,, 8 The

91.

92.

93.

94.
95.

Compare H.R. 1172, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as passed by Indiana

House, Jan. 31, 20o6), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo6/
HB/HB117 2.3.html, with H.R. 1172, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (as passed
by Indiana Senate, Feb. 28, 20o6), available at http://www.in.gov/Iegislative/
bills/2oo6/EH/EH1172.1.html. After the Senate passed its version of House Bill 1172, a
conference committee, composed of two members from each chamber, met and adopted a
compromise version of House Bill 1172, which reinserted the House's life-begins-atconception and fetal-pain provisions into the Senate version, but omitted the House's fetalanesthesia provision. J. HOUSE, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 1121-22 (Ind. 2006)
(reporting the committee's version of House Bill 1172). The House passed the conference
committee's version of House Bill 1172 on March 14, 2006, by a vote of seventy-five to
twenty-three. J. HouSE, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 1233 (Ind. 2006). The conference
committee report, however, was not voted on in the Senate by the end of the session. See J.
SENATE, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006).
See J. SENATE, 114 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 671-72 (Ind. 2006) (passing House Bill io8o
as amended); id. at 711 (passing House Bill 1172 as amended).
Miller,
Pat
Vote?:
They
Did
Life,
How
to
Right
Indiana
See
http://www.indianalife.org/html/bills/legbills.asp?legid=223&Submit2=Search (last visited
May 6, 2009) (reporting Miller as voting "pro-life" loo% of the time).
McNeil, supra note 49.
Id. ("[Miller] said that besides not addressing the reduction of unwanted pregnancies,
[House Bills 1172 and lo8o] did not encourage more women to give their babies up for
adoption.").
Id.

96.
97. Id.

9s. Editorial, Legislation Intrudes into PrivateAffairs, INDIANAPOLIS

STAR,

Jan. 28, 2006, at A14.
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editorial board noted that it "ha[d] consistently opposed abortion" and that it
found the existing eighteen-hour mandatory waiting period "reasonable." 9 9
But it found that House Bill 1172, by requiring physicians to tell women that
life begins at conception, ignored the "uncertainty" over what is "as much a
moral concept as it is a medical issue" and one on which "there isn't a uniform
answer among the medical, scientific, or religious communities."' 0 And with
its fetal pain notification requirement, House Bill 1172 "would require
physicians to give women information that might not be true."'"' With regard
to House Bill io8o, the board opined that "[w]hile clinics should be held to the
highest standards for safety and patient care, it's not the legislature's job to
dictate the width of hallways in private businesses."'0 2
The unusual role played here by prominent antiabortion voices invites
examination for what it might portend for future TRAP bills. In opposing
House Bill io8o, the editorial board of the IndianapolisStar invoked an ideal of
limited government, harkening back to traditional libertarian arguments
against restrictive abortion laws -though its concern was the property rights of
private businesses rather than the reproductive rights of women. Beyond the
possible appeal of libertarian arguments, two other potential lessons emerge;
these are the subject of the remainder of this Essay. First, TRAP laws can
sometimes be resisted by exposing their actual effect, as well as the true intent
motivating some of their leading proponents.0 3 Second, common-ground
alternative approaches, which may in fact be more effective in reducing the
number of abortions than TRAP laws, might play a key role in defeating them.
Both lessons prove instructive for legislators and voters from across the
ideological spectrum as they confront TRAP laws that are presented as health
and safety regulations but threaten to diminish the availability of abortion
services without evidence of countervailing health and safety benefits.
First, however, a caution: the opposition from antiabortion quarters to the
House versions of House Bill io8o and House Bill 1172 might not be easily
replicated, as evidenced by both its deviation from the norm of antiabortion
advocacy for such legislation and subsequent events in Indiana itself. In the
following legislative sessions, legislators pursued the restrictions contained in

99. Id.
1OO.

Id.

101.

Id.

io2. Id.
103.

See, e.g., supra notes

7-12

and accompanying text. As discussed below, see infra note 122 and

accompanying text, of course not all who support TRAP laws are motivated by a desire to
shut down clinics.
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House Bill 1080104 and House Bill 1172,05 as well as other restrictions,
particularly as "poison pill" amendments 1"6 used to prevent the enactment of
bills on subjects from inspections of day care centers for lead-based paint" 7 to
kidney dialysis.s An antiabortion "poison pill" helps explain why Indiana is
one of only five states19 in the nation without a criminal law banning hate
crimes.11 One of these instances illustrates the special challenge created when

104.

See, e.g., S. 166, li 5 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 20o8) (as amended by
Representative

Jeff

Thompson,

Feb.

26,

20o8),

available

at

http ://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2o8/PDF/HAMF/MOo166o2.0o2.pdf
(seeking
to
remove the grandfather clause exception in the Health Department's licensing requirements
for existing abortion clinics, with compliance by all abortion clinics mandated by January 1,
2012); S. 221, 11
5 th Gen Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.2007) (as introduced by Senator Dennis
Kruse, Jan. 8, 2007), availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo7/IN/INo22.1.html
(requiring compliance by July 1, 2011).
105. See, e.g., S. 9o, 1l6th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009) (as passed by Indiana Senate,

Feb. 1O, 2009), availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo9/SB/SBoo9o.2.html; S.
146, 115 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 20o8) (as passed by Indiana Senate, Jan. 29,
20o8), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo8/SB/SBo146.1.html; S.135, ii5th
Gen Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (as introduced, Jan. 11,2007), available at

1o6.

http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo7/IN/INo135.1.html; S. 172, 115th Gen Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (as introduced, Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.in.gov/
legislative/bills/2oo7/lN/INo172.i.html.
In 2oo8 alone, opponents of abortion introduced twenty-eight abortion-related
amendments to nineteen bills, according to pro-choice advocates. JOAN LASKOWSKI, SESSION
SUMMARY AND VOTING RECORDS: 2008 INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (20o8),

http ://www.aclu-in.org/upload/newsletters/2oo8SummaryandVotingRecords.pdf;

available at
Planned

Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, 20o8 Indiana "Poison Pill" List (Mar. 18, 20o8),

http ://advocates.ppin.org/poison-pills.aspx.
iiSth Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (as amended by Representative Jackie
Walorski, Feb. 26, 20o8), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo8/PDF/
HAMP/M0o1 4 305.oo5.pdf. This amendment, which also would have required abortion
clinics to pass lead-based paint inspections, passed the House, J. HOUSE, 115th Gen. Assem.,
2d Reg. Sess. 671 (Ind. 20o8), but was removed from the bill during the House and Senate
Conference Committee, see J. HOUSE, 11
5th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 886-89 (Ind. 20o8).
The governor ultimately signed bill S. 143 into law without the abortion restriction. J.

107. S. 143,

SENATE, 115 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 1772 (Ind. 20o8).

io8. S.166, 115th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (as amended by Representative Jeff
Thompson, Feb. 26, 20o8), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo8/PDF/
HAMF/ MOo166o2.oo2.pdf.
iog. Those states are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See AntiDefamation League, State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, http://www.adl.org/
99hatecrime/state_hate crime laws.pdf (last visited May 6, 2009).
11o.
See H.R. 1076, ii5 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (as amended by Representative
Jeff Thompson, Jan. 24, 20o8), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo8/PDF/
HAMF/MO01o76o 3 .oo6.pdf; Planned Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, supra note 1o6.
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observers and even legislators have a difficult time. discovering when an
abortion restriction has been introduced. A 20o8 amendment to a kidney
dialysis bill would have removed the grandfather clause in the Department of
Health's clinic-licensing requirements." ' This amendment was very difficult to
spot, however, for two reasons. First, it was added late in the process, after the
3
bill had already passed the Senate1 2 and the House Committee on Insurance.'
More significant, the amendment made no mention of abortion-it instead
referred to the numerical citation for the relevant Indiana Code sections that
granted the Department of Health the authority to create licensing
114
requirements for abortion providers.
Frustrated by their near-victories but ultimate failure to enact new
legislation since 2005, anti-Roe advocates increased the political heat on Indiana
legislators. Indiana Right to Life blamed, among others, President Pro
Tempore of the Indiana Senate Bob Garton for failing to ensure a vote on the
abortion restrictions before the 2006 legislature adjourned.1 Garton, an antichoice Republican, had served in the Indiana Senate for thirty-six years and as
President Pro Tempore for twenty-six years.6 Nonetheless, in 2006, for the

first time since 1970, ' 7 Garton faced a challenge in the Republican primary by a
candidate who ran from the far ideological right." 8 The challenger won, in a
surprise upset that might strike fear in other Republican legislators. 9
Additionally, in 2008, Indiana Right to Life sent a memo to Democratic
members of the House notifying them that it would not support a single
Democratic candidate, even those with strong anti-choice records whom the

After Representative Thompson's amendment, House Bill 1076 was not called for a second
reading and was effectively defeated. See J. HousE, 115th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.
Planned Parenthood Advocates of Indiana, 20o8 Indiana Legislation (Mar. 18,
http://advocates.ppin.org/2oo8-legislation.aspx#hb1o76.
20o8);

iii.

Ind. S.

20o8),

166.

J.

SENATE, ii 5 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 386 (Ind. 20o8).
113. J. HOUSE, 115 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 624-28 (Ind. 2008).
112.

114. Ind. S. 166.

115. See Michele McNeil, Senate Leader Ousted: Greg Walker Stuns 36-Year Old Veteran Garton;
Departure Creates Power Vacuum, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 3, 2006, at Al; Bill Ruthhart,
Anti-Abortion Group Shuns Garton, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 6, 2006, at B2.
116. See Mary Beth Schneider, Garton Wielded Power for 26 Years, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 7,
2006, at B3.
117.
118.

McNeil, supra note 115.
See Russ Pulliam, Pro-Life David Runs Against Goliath, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 16, 20o6, at
E2 (describing Garton's opponent in the primary as "a more conservative alternative").

iig. See McNeil, supra note

115.
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organization had previously supported, because it blamed the Democratic
House leadership for the House's recent failure to enact any new abortion
restrictions.120
Both Senator Miller and Representative Welch were among the Indiana
legislators who supported new restrictions on the provision of abortion services
during the legislative sessions that followed the 20o6 defeat of House Bill io8o.
Most significant, they cosponsored legislation, which the legislature nearly
enacted in 2009, that would have prohibited physicians from performing
abortions unless they possessed admitting or transfer privileges at a hospital
located near the clinic-again, a burdensome requirement that appears
reasonable on its face. Although this subsequent action suggests that their
opposition to the extreme version of House Bill io8o may have reflected factors
unique to that bill, statements at the time by both Senator Miller and
Representative Welch do suggest potentially effective responses to TRAP
legislation: establish the intent behind the legislation and its actual effect, and
highlight common-ground alternative approaches to reducing abortion
IV. DISCERNING TRAP LAWS'

EFFECTS

The expected impact of House Bill io8o as passed by the Indiana House closing all then-existing clinics-would have been extreme, which helps
account for its defeat and the opposition to it even from some abortion
opponents. Often, however, making a convincing case against a TRAP bill demonstrating its harm to services and the lack of any countervailing benefit is exceedingly difficult. As discussed above, leading anti-choice organizations
have made the enactment of clinic regulation laws "which often shut down
clinics" a priority.'2 1 Their aim is to craft bills that diminish the availability of
services while appearing moderate and health-related, thereby appealing to
legislators and voters who would not support a direct prohibition on abortion
services.' Indeed, many legislators who vote for such bills may not share the

120. See Memorandum from Mike Fichter, Chairman, Ind. Right to Life Political Action Comm.,
to Ind. Legislative Candidates (Aug. 28, 20o8), http://www.candidatesurveys.comV
documents/irtlpolicy2oo8.pdf.
121.

122.

Bopp Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6.
Americans United for Life, for example, in its Road Map to Reversing Roe v. Wade, placed
the priority on "regulations which emphasize the risks to women and the need to protect
women," Forsythe, supra note 12, at 65, and specifically listed regulations that "[r]aise the
requirements for clinic regulations" along with restrictions on "[i]nformed consent,"
minors, and "abortifacients, including RU-486," id.at 70. The Road Map describes the
target audience for the focus on health and women as "the 60% of people in the 'middle'
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motivations of those who crafted the legislation and may even consider
themselves supporters of Roe v. Wade.
More generally, in the many years since Casey reaffirmed Roe's "central
holding, 123 the appeal of "compromise" restrictions has grown among Roe's
supporters. Complacency about Roe's security has been fortified by what can be
described as abortion fear and fatigue: fear about the impact of the issue on
other legal and political objectives, and a fatigue manifested in a desire for the
issue to be resolved in order to allow focus and energy to be allocated to other
goals. Abortion has always been viewed, in the main, as a difficult and risky
issue that is best avoided at political, professional, and personal levels alike. In
recent years, efforts by anti-choice advocates to increase the stigma associated
with abortion appear to have contributed, if not to a weakening of support for
the legality of abortion -most polls indicate support has remained relatively
steady'24 - sthen to discomfort with the issue, including a reluctance even to
12
name it.
Abortion fear and fatigue underlie certain refrains among some who
support keeping abortion legal and who are otherwise politically progressive:
that abortion plays too great a role in electoral politics, constitutional law, and
Supreme Court confirmations; that battles over abortion have cost elections
and distracted from other social ills; that the progressive constitutional vision
might not accommodate Roe; that the current state of affairs is not particularly
harmful to women; and that Casey will hold and the Court will never overrule
Roe. This account deserves respect and careful response, for it reflects
important realities. Ultimately, however, it is dangerously incomplete and
misguided. Among its shortcomings, it encourages a tolerance-even a
welcoming -of political "compromises" that actually betray core commitments
to conceptions of equality, liberty, and justice. These putative compromises
take the form of abortion restrictions, such as TRAP laws, that are finely
crafted to sound reasonable and to appeal to moderates, but that in practice
impose disproportionate burdens on the most vulnerable women and
exacerbate existing inequalities -much as the pre-Roe regime of state

123.

who are conflicted or ambivalent about abortion." Id. at 71; see supra notes
accompanying text.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).

124.

See, e.g., Gallup, supra note 17.

125.

Cf Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of a
Shiing Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41 (2008) (describing changes in the Supreme

7-12

and

Court's discourse about abortion from its decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to
its decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)).
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regulation resulted in grossly disparate harms that tracked economic and
political power.
House Bill 1o8o demonstrates just how devastating TRAP laws can be, but
rarely is the impact of such laws so obvious. The particulars vary substantially,
making it difficult sometimes to know whether the term "TRAP law" is even
appropriate."' For example, notwithstanding the defeat of House Bill 1o8o,
Indiana is among the states typically cited as already having a TRAP law in
effect'27 - namely, Indiana's 2005 law that led to the Department of Health's
thirty-plus pages of physical structure requirements for clinics. The
regulations, however, included a grandfather clause protecting existing
providers from the most burdensome of the regulations, which new clinics not yet in existence-would have to satisfy."8 This underscores that the actual

impact of TRAP laws is notoriously difficult to assess, because it occurs over
time 2 9 and because abortion providers do what they can to minimize the harm,
especially by seeking statutory exemptions' 30 and working with state regulators
post-enactment to win waivers, exemptions, and extensions. Grandfather
clauses, such as the one in the Indiana regulations, constitute one common

See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 66 (reporting that "[1]egislative fences have been erected that
significantly reduce abortions" and citing the twenty-seven states with "abortion clinic
regulations"). It may not always be clear whether a particular piece of legislation should be
considered a TRAP law in the sense that phrase typically is used-that is, to connote a
medically unnecessary restriction that would diminish the availability of abortion services
under the guise of protecting health. It is possible that a particular regulation aimed only at
abortion providers might be motivated by a desire to protect women's health -and in fact
do so-but that certainly was not the case with House Bill lo8o. See generally NARAL: ProChoice America,
State
Profiles, http ://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-actioncenter/inyour-state/who-decides/state-profiles/ (last visited May 6, 2009) (providing a
database with all abortion restrictions and regulations in each state).
127. See NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, supra note 15; Hafkin, supra note 54; Center for Reproductive
Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the TRAP,
http ://reproductiverights.org/document/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trapavoiding-the-trap.
,18. See 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-17-2(f) (2008).
1a6.

ia9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison, 126 F.3d

1042, 1046 (8th Cir.
1997) (affirming that an Iowa statute that required a new abortion clinic to be subject to a
"certificate of need" review constituted an undue burden on the abortion right, in part
because this statute was passed ten years prior to its enforcement in this case and because in
the interim Iowa did not enforce it against any similarly situated heath care facility).
130. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-1(f) (2008) (exempting facilities that perform ten or
fewer abortions in any month, one hundred or fewer a year, and do not hold themselves out
to the public as an abortion provider through advertising).
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approach to mitigating harm.131 Thus, opposition to a bill usually must depend
upon conjecture about highly uncertain future effects.' 32 What is entirely clear,
however, is that the resulting harm falls disproportionately on the most
vulnerable women because the principal effect of such laws is to decrease the
availability and raise the costs of already-diminishing abortion services. 33 One
result, especially for women who lack resources, might be that larger numbers
of women will have later-term, more morally problematic, and more physically
dangerous abortions.
A relatively new form of TRAP law, promoted by anti-choice organizations
and legislators around the country, is illustrative of both the harms TRAP laws
threaten and the difficulty of successful opposition. This form of restriction
would require that physicians who perform abortions obtain admitting or
"transfer" privileges at local hospitals. Senator Patricia Miller, who in 2006 was
instrumental in amending House Bill io8o to remove its most harmful effects,
has in each of the three years since introduced 3 4 legislation that would have
prohibited physicians from performing abortions unless they have "privileges
at a hospital located: (1)in the county; or (2) in a county adjacent -to the
county; in which the abortion is performed."' 35 The Indiana Senate passed the
bill each year.' 36 Representative Peggy Welch, another opponent of the extreme

131. See also Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 6o8 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing

how the Director of the Ohio Department of Health "has granted waivers and variances to
...abortion clinics in the past"); Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Drummond, No. 07-4164,
2007 WL 2811407, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2007) (emphasizing Missouri's willingness to
grant a waiver of its clinic design requirements for an existing facility and the factors
Missouri would consider).
132. See, e.g., Drummond, 2007 WL 2811407, at *8 (enjoining Missouri's clinic design
requirements because whether the state would require full compliance, as opposed to
granting a waiver, was unknown).
133. See, e.g., Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 162 (4 th Cir. 2000)
(acknowledging that South Carolina's abortion clinic regulations would increase the cost of
each abortion by $22 to $368, depending on the clinic).
134. J. SENATE, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 31 (Ind.2009) (listing Senator Patricia Miller as
the author); J.SENATE, ii5th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 17 (Ind. 2008) (listing Senator
Patricia Miller as a coauthor with Senator Jeff Drozda); J. SENATE, 115 th Gen. Assem., ist
Reg. Sess. 32 (Ind.2007) (listing Senator Patricia Miller as the author).
135. S.89, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.2009) (as passed by Indiana Senate, Feb. lo,
2oo9), available at http://www.in.govlegislative/bills/2oo9/SB/SBoo8 9 .1.html; S. 146,
115 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (as passed by Indiana Senate, Jan. 29, 20o8),
available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/blls/2oo8/SB/SBo1 4 6.1.html; S.194, 115th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.2007) (as passed by Indiana Senate, Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2oo7/SB/SBo1 94 .1.html.
136. J. SENATE, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 292 (Ind.2009) (passing the Indiana Senate on
Feb. 1O, 2009, by a vote of forty-four to six); J. SENATE, 115 th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 376
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version of House Bill io8o, cosponsored the hospital-privileges legislation in
the House, 13 7 and in April of 2009, the House passed an amended version of
the bill., 8 Among several significant changes, the House bill extended the
reach of the privileges requirement beyond providers of abortions to cover
other health care providers who perform surgical procedures.13 9
Eleven states currently impose some form of hospital-admitting privileges

or patient-transfer requirement, though their precise requirements vary
dramatically.' 4 ° In 2008, legislation was introduced in Congress to impose a

(Ind.2008) (passing the Indiana Senate on Jan. 29, 20o8, by a vote of thirty-nine to nine);
J. SENATE, ll5th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 528 (Ind. 2007) (passing the Indiana Senate on
Feb. 27, 2007, by a vote of thirty-seven to ten).
137. J. HOUSE, ii 5th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 470 (Ind. 2008) (adding Representative Peggy
Welch as a cosponsor of the bill in the House); J. HOUSE, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.

713 (Ind. 2007) (listing Representative Peggy Welch as a co-sponsor of the bill in the
House).
138. See J. SENATE, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 1369 (Ind.2009).
139. S.

89

(as

passed

by

the

Indiana

House,

Apr.

15,

2009),

available at

http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2o09/ES/ESoo89.2.html. The House bill exempted,
however, "surgical procedures performed by dentists licensed under IC 25-14." Id. It also
included two other substantial changes: a requirement that physicians notify women
contemplating having an abortion that "the fetus might feel pain" and the establishment of a
program for breast and cervical cancer screening. Id. The Senate dissented from all of the
House's amendments, J. SENATE, n6th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 1373 (Ind. 2009), and
the bill died when the Senate and House failed to reconcile these differences before the end
of the 2009 legislative session, Deadlock Kills Abortion Doctor Bill, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr.
29, 2009, http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2009904290411. Differences
over the addition of the costly cancer screening program were cited as the main cause of the
bill's ultimate failure. Id.; Bill Ruthhart, Fate of Abortion Bill Is Up in the Air, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.indystar.com/article/2oo9o428/NEWSoo1/9o428o375.
140. See Smith, supra note 24, at 116 (reporting that eleven states currently require that abortion
providers maintain hospital admitting privileges); Steven Ertelt, Indiana Senate Backs Bill
Requiring Abortion Providers To Have Hospital Privs, LIFENEWS.CoM, Feb. 4, 2009,

http://www.lifenews.com/state381o.html (listing the eleven states with admitting privileges
statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah); see, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36449.03(F)(4) (2008) (requiring that abortion recovery rooms must have "[a] physician with
admitting privileges at an accredited hospital in this state [who] remains on the premises of
the abortion clinic"); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§

390.012(3)(c)(1) (West 2008) (requiring "a medical

director who is licensed to practice medicine in this state and who has admitting privileges
at a licensed hospital in this state or has a transfer agreement with a licensed hospital within
reasonable proximity of the clinic"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.o8o (West 2009) ("Any
physician performing or inducing an abortion who does not have clinical privileges at a
hospital which offers obstetrical or gynecological tare located within thirty miles of the
location at which the abortion is performed or induced shall be guilty of a class A
");OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701:83-19 (2006) (requiring "a written transfer
misdemeanor ....
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nationwide requirement that "[a] physician who performs an abortion shall...
have admitting privileges at a hospital to which the physician can travel in one
hour or less." 4 ' That same year, Indiana Right to Life instituted the "bold new
strategy" of seeking enactment of a hospital privileges requirement at the
county level, through local county ordinances. 142 It was successful in enacting
the requirement in Vanderburgh County and Dubois County,'43 and tried and
failed in Allen County.' 44 Now Indiana's abortion providers and other
concerned observers must not only monitor the state legislature, ever alert for
the possibility of abortion restrictions hidden in eleventh-hour amendments to
unrelated legislation, but they must also track the activity of Indiana's ninetytwo counties. USA Today covered this development and reported that national
organizations on both sides of the issue were closely following this effort to
impose restrictions at a new level of government. 145 The President of Indiana
Right to Life told USA Today that the ordinances would both protect women's
health and, he hoped, would make abortion services more difficult for women
to obtain.

146

Like other TRAP laws, provisions requiring admitting or transfer privileges
at a nearby hospital seem, on their face, to be aimed at promoting patients'
health, and the costs they would impose are not immediately apparent.
Providers of abortion services and some supporters of Roe contend that such
requirements serve no medical need and would impose a great burden -quite
simply, because hospitals are not required and in fact are unlikely to grant
physicians the privileges the legislation requires. Again, the precise effect of
these regulations is difficult-perhaps impossible-to establish prior to their
implementation and the passage of time.

agreement with a hospital for transfer of patients in the event of medical complications,
emergency situations, and for other needs as they arise").
141. Pregnant Women Health and SafetyAct, S. 2788, lloth Cong. § 2(b) (2oo8).
142. See Thomas B. Langhorne, E-mails Show Planning Behind Abortion Ordinance, EvANsv=
COURIER & PRESS (Ind.), Oct. 1o, 2008, http://www.courierpress.convnews/2oo8/oct/o/emails-show-planningbehind-abortion-ordinance.
143. See Amanda lacone, Long Touts State's Abortion Legislation: Favors Single Law To Assure
Patients'Follow-UpCare, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Oct. 14, 2o8, at C1.
14. See Amanda Iacone, County Seeks Wider Doctor-Privilege Law, J. GAZETrE (Fort Wayne,

Ind.), Feb.

5, 2009,

at C8 (noting that county "commissioners debated the proposed

ordinance and received feedback from residents but never introduced the ordinance for a
vote").
145.

See Keen, supra note 16 (noting that this "'new strategy"' was one that "abortion-rights
groups say might be the leading edge of a nationwide effort to limit access to the
procedure").

146.

Id.
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A 2006 federal court of appeals decision helps demonstrate the practical
challenges created by government mandates of admitting privileges or transfer
agreements and the limited judicial protection against the resulting burdens. In
Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird,47 the Sixth Circuit reversed a
district court's finding that Ohio had acted unconstitutionally in denying a
request for a license renewal filed by an abortion clinic operating in Dayton,
Ohio.4 8 State law required that the clinic obtain a written transfer agreement
with a local hospital, but hospitals were free to refuse such requests. The local
hospital refused to enter into a transfer agreement, and the Director of the
Ohio Department of Health, in the exercise of his statutory discretion, refused
1 49
to grant a waiver from the licensing requirement.
The court found that the license denial, if upheld, would shut down a clinic
that performed approximately three thousand abortions a year and was the
only clinic in southern Ohio that performed abortions after eighteen or
nineteen weeks of pregnancy. ° The court nonetheless held that requiring
women to travel longer distances did not constitute an unconstitutional undue
burden."'s The court reached this conclusion without first requiring any
demonstration that the transfer agreement actually promoted any medical
purpose. The court also held that there was no unconstitutional delegation of
authority to the private hospital effectively to close the clinic through denial of
the transfer agreement, because the state health director had the ultimate
authority to grant the license without it (which the director refused to do) .152
The district court had found that the Ohio Health Director and the Ohio
Department of Health "were affected by political pressure from constituents
and politicians to find a way to 'shut down' the clinic" in denying the waiver
application and license application, but the Sixth Circuit held that that did not

Cir. 2006).
148. Id. at 616. The Sixth Circuit did, however, affirm the district court's conclusion that the
clinic's procedural due process rights were violated when it was not afforded a hearing
before Ohio issued a cease-and-desist order closing the clinic, thereby depriving the clinic of
its "property interest in its ongoing business." Id. at 613. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
vacated the district court's preliminary injunction because the sole remaining violation, "the
procedural due process violation[,] can be remedied" by a hearing. Id. at 616. The Sixth
Circuit then remanded the case because "it would be inappropriate for [the Court] to
presume what decision might be reached during the hearing." Id.
147. 438 F.3d 595 (6th

149. Id. at 599-6Ol.

iSo. Id.
isi.

Id. at 605.

1S2.

Id. at 61o.
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amount to, and that the facts did not support, a finding that the denial
reflected an unconstitutional purpose." 3
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Baird provides insight into how such
requirements work in practice. It showcases the lack of evidence of medical
need for the requirement; the extensive lobbying from anti-choice
organizations, elected officials, and others of both the local hospital and the
state agency to deny the transfer agreement and the license in order to close the
clinic (the hospital first agreed, then withdrew its agreement);1s4 the deviation
from typical internal decision-making processes, including the exclusion of the
state official who ordinarily would have reviewed the request; ' s and the state
director's refusal to accept an alternative that depended on keeping confidential
the names of physicians who agreed to provide equivalent support but, because
of security concerns, only if their identities would be kept confidential." 6
At times, analyzing the contours of a right requires delving deeply into the
practicalities of the exercise and oversight of that right. That certainly was true,
for example, of the voting rights of African Americans, who for decades were
guaranteed the right to vote in theory, but in practice faced literacy tests, poll

153.

Id. at 6o8 (quoting Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 277 F. Supp. 2d 862, 879
(S.D. Ohio 2003)).

154. Id. at 599-600.

Id. at 601-02.
156. See id. at 616. The court noted the limited authority on "whether requiring women to travel
further for an abortion constitutes an undue burden." Id. at 604. The court first cited the
Fourth Circuit's Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant decision, which upheld a South Carolina
licensing requirement that closed an abortion clinic and found no evidence that the
additional seventy miles women would have to travel to obtain an abortion created an undue
burden. Id. at 604 (citing Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 170-71 (4 th Cir.
2000)). The court then cited the Eighth Circuit's Fargo's Women's Health Organization v.
Schafer decision, which found that "a single trip, whatever the distance to the medical
facility, [would not] create an undue burden." Id. (citing Fargo's Women's Health Org. v.
Schafer, 18 F. 3 d 526, 533 (8th Cir. 1994)). Finally, the court cited the Supreme Court's
Mazurek v. Armstrong decision, which upheld a Montana statute requiring abortions to be
performed by licensed physicians as not imposing an undue burden, in part because the
statute would not require women "to travel to a different facility than was previously
available." Id. at 605 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997)). The court
found that the Mazurek decision "intimated that the distance a woman must travel to obtain
an abortion factors into the" undue burden analysis, but concluded that "binding and
persuasive authority of other courts does not firmly establish when distance becomes an
undue burden on a woman's right to chose to have an abortion." Id. at 605. The court,
however, neglected to mention the Ninth Circuit's Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden decision,
which stated that "[a] significant increase in the cost of abortion or the supply of abortion
providers and clinics can, at some point, constitute a substantial obstacle to a significant
155.

number of women choosing an abortion." 379 F.3d 531, 541 ( 9 th Cir. 2004).
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taxes, and violence. And it is increasingly true with regard to the constitutional
right of reproductive liberty. As is now appreciated in the context of the long
battle against racial segregation and discrimination in voting, employment, and
public accommodations, real and substantial interference with rights can result
from a complex interplay between direct governmental regulations,
government-endorsed messages, the empowerment of private interference with
rights, and private actions of various kinds.
Nationwide, the number of abortion providers has declined steadily since
the early 198Os. 5 7 A combination of legal and extralegal pressures has left three
states-Mississippi, North Dakota, and South Dakota-just one clinic away
from being "abortion free. "s8 Governments at various levels have contributed
to this diminishing availability of abortion services, as well as to the growing
social stigma around abortion and the demeaning of women who choose to
have abortions. These developments are at odds with our constitutional
commitments to liberty and equality. Legislators contemplating the enactment
of additional abortion restrictions should carefully consider their potential
impact on the women and healthcare providers most likely to be affected by
them.
Although the Supreme Court in Casey lessened the degree of judicial
protection by adopting a new "undue burden" standard of review, the Court's
application of that standard in Casey retained from Roe's strict scrutiny
approach the insight that the right at issue is that of every woman; it is not a
group right that can be satisfied by respecting the rights of most women. For
example, the Casey Court took care to assess the burden that a husbandnotification provision would have on those it would truly affect: the small
minority of women who, absent government compulsion, would not choose to
involve their husbands in the decision. l 9 The fact that the vast majority of
married couples make this decision jointly, the Court held, did not negate the
unconstitutional burden the government imposed on a minority of women by
attempting to compel such communications." 6' Even some supporters of Roe
have lost sight of the fact that at stake is the constitutional right of each
individual woman to make her own decision whether to continue or terminate
a pregnancy. At issue is the right of each woman actually affected -not some

157. HENSHAW & KOST,

supra note

36, at 26-27.

158. See Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim at 'Roe,' WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at A4;
Frontline: The Last Abortion Clinic, supra note 7.

159. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-95 (1992).
16o. Id. at 894 (rejecting respondents' argument that because 20% of women who obtain an
abortion are married and 95% of married women notify their husbands of their abortion, the
husband-notification provision "imposes almost no burden at all").
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evenly distributed, incremental burden on all women. The harmful effects of
TRAP laws fall disproportionately on women who already suffer challenges of
economic status, educational status, domestic violence, and distance from
providers.
A principled approach to reproductive rights should genuinely honor our
nation's constitutional commitment to equal justice. Critical to that endeavor is
an appreciation of the real-world impact of abortion restrictions short of bans.
State criminal bans on abortion pre-Roe disparately affected women largely
along lines of wealth and other means, making abortions completely
unavailable for some, but more difficult and dangerous for many. In some
places today, a multitude of restrictions on the availability of abortion
services - some already in place and many more under consideration - threaten
a similarly discriminatory effect: making abortion more difficult and dangerous
for many, and completely unobtainable for some. Even in contexts in which
judges should not or will not uphold constitutional values of equality and
liberty by constraining government (for example, out of deference to elected
officials), these values should nonetheless guide the actions of state legislatures
and other law and policy makers.16 1
CONCLUSION: SEEKING COMMON GROUND

Beyond illustrating the potential impact of TRAP laws, the Indiana
experience supports an alternative approach more in keeping with our nation's
fundamental commitments to liberty and equality. One question raised in the
debate over House Bill io8o and House Bill 1172 was the proposed legislation's
likely effectiveness in reducing the number of abortions. Senator Patricia
Miller, for example, expressed concern that the legislation did not adequately
address the larger issue of reducing abortions; she particularly favored a
greater focus on encouraging adoption.162 Planned Parenthood of Indiana
President Betty Cockrum similarly urged lawmakers to support family
planning efforts to prevent unintended pregnancy, which would reduce the
need for abortion. 6, Senator Miller, Betty Cockrum, and others promoted

161.
Again, this Essay does not consider how courts are likely to adjudicate the constitutionality
of TRAP laws, which would be governed by the undue burden analysis of Casey. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
163. See Schneider & McNeil, supra note 38 ("Planed [sic] Parenthood President and CEO Betty
Cockrum said that if lawmakers want to reduce the need for abortions, they should be
supporting family planning groups. 'That's how they need to spend their time and energy,
and not on passing unconstitutional laws,' Cockrum said.").
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alternatives to the proposed abortion restrictions. Similar themes emerged in
South Dakota during the efforts to criminalize abortion. The leader of South
Dakota's task force on abortion, who was herself opposed to Roe, criticized the
task force's strongly anti-Roe report, expressing concerns about the report's
the state
scientific accuracy and objectivity and explaining that she believed
64
ought to support policies that would reduce unwanted pregnancy.
"Common ground" instead of "compromise" is a useful way of
conceptualizing the organizing principle that should guide constructive efforts
to bridge the abortion divide. A common-ground approach should situate
abortion where it logically belongs as a matter of public policy and
constitutional values: within a broader agenda that empowers individuals both
to prevent unintended pregnancy and to choose wanted childbearing through a
range of government-supported programs for women and families. Common
ground is not a new concept in the reproductive rights arena, but it may be one
6s

whose time has come.1

Several facts provide an important foundation to a common-ground
approach. Of the six million pregnancies that occur among American women
each year, half are unintended. 66 By age forty-five, more than half of women
will have experienced an unintended pregnancy, and about one-third will have
had an abortion. 6' The typical woman, who bears two children, spends about
three decades of her life trying to avoid an unintended pregnancy, compared
with about five years trying to become pregnant, being pregnant, or
postpartum. 68 Among the three million unintended pregnancies each year,
about half occur among couples who did not use contraception in the month
the woman became pregnant; the other half of couples used some

164. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of WomanProtectiveAntiabortionArgument, 57 DuKE L.J. 1641, 1681-84 (2008).

165. See, e.g., Salmon, supra note 18 (noting that "during the campaign, [Barack Obama] spoke
of wanting to reduce abortions and of finding 'common ground' in the debate" and
reporting on recent "common-ground" efforts by some abortion opponents).
166. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Unintended Pregnancy Prevention: Home,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/index.htm (last visited May
6, 2009) (citing Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparitiesin Rates of Unintended
Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 92
(20o6)).
167. RACHEL BENSON GOLD ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., NEXT STEPS FOR AMERICA'S FAMILY
PLANNING PROGRAM: LEVERAGING THE POTENTIAL OF MEDICAID AND TITLE X IN AN
EVOLVING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 6-7 (2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/

168.

NextSteps.pdf.
Id. at 6.
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contraceptive method, but typically inconsistently or improperly. 69
Contraceptive use matters greatly: the two-thirds of sexually active women
who properly use contraception all year account for only 5% of unintended
pregnancies.7 7 Low-income women are more likely to have inadequate access
to contraceptives than wealthy women. While the national rate of unintended
pregnancies "stagnated" between 1994 and 2001, the rate of unintended
pregnancies rose among low-income women and decreased among wealthy
women.17' Public policy must address these realities.
In Indiana as elsewhere, many people on all sides of the abortion issue
support the goal of reducing the number of abortions. Differences certainly
arise over how best to achieve that goal. In contrast with compromise abortion
restrictions that diminish services, increase costs, and constrain choices,
common-ground efforts to prevent unintended pregnancy and support postconception options, including healthy childbearing and adoption, work to
reduce the number of abortions by enhancing responsible reproductive
decisionmaking and by empowering especially those most in need of support.
Common-ground alternatives are thus in keeping with our fundamental
commitments to liberty and equality.
Another striking possibility about TRAP laws is that their approach to
reducing abortion-making services more expensive and less available-may
also prove ineffective, and certainly not as effective as some alternatives.
Although, as discussed, their actual effect is difficult to predict or measure,
TRAP laws that target clinics with medically unnecessary regulations, not
imposed on comparable health care providers, might in some instances have
the indirect and perverse effect of increasing the number of abortions or
delaying abortion. The same clinics that provide abortion services often are
principal providers of pregnancy prevention services and other reproductive
and sexual health care. Indeed, six out of ten clients of family planning clinics
cite the clinic as their "usual" source of health care.1 72 Nationally, the
Guttmacher Institute estimates that publicly funded contraceptive services help
women prevent nearly two million unintended pregnancies each year and that
without these services, the number of abortions would be nearly two-thirds
higher. 73 By increasing the costs of providing abortion services (including
expensive building renovations), TRAP laws could increase the costs of, or

169. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 166, at 92.
170. GOLD ETAL., supra note 167, at 7.

171.

Id. at o.

172.

Id. at 16.

173. Id. at 4.
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divert resources from, the provider's other health services, including those
aimed at preventing pregnancy. In any event, a direct focus of those resources
on prevention and healthy childbearing promises to be more effective in
reducing unintended pregnancy, and therefore abortions.
In Indiana, for example, among the abortion providers targeted by House
Bill io8o were clinics run by Planned Parenthood of Indiana. Betty Cockrum
testified on behalf of Planned Parenthood against the legislation, stating that
the clinics could not renovate or relocate by the effective dates of House Bill
io8o and that coming into compliance at some later date would require
extremely costly renovations or relocations.174 Only 5%of Planned Parenthood
of Indiana's patients obtain abortion services, "' which are available at only
three of its thirty-five locations.176 Ninety-five percent of its patients come for
other services, including contraceptives, cancer screenings, and tests and
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases." 7 In 2006, Planned Parenthood
began offering onsite adoption services178 and currently offers onsite adoption
services at all three of its clinics that perform abortions. 7 9 Planned Parenthood
also launched a "Prevention First" initiative,' 8° which in 2009 included the

174.

Cockrum, supra note 69.

175. Betty Cockrum, President, Planned Parenthood of Ind., Equality Day Speech (Aug. 24,
2007) (on file with author).
176. Compare Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Abortion Services, http://www.ppin.org/
abservices.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009) (listing three locations providing abortion
services), with Planned Parenthood of Indiana, A Planned Parenthood Health Center Is Near
You and a Caregiver Is Waiting for Your Call, http://www.ppin.org/locations.aspx (last
visited May 6, 2009) (listing thirty-five locations).
17. See Cockrum, supra note 175. Nationally, Planned Parenthood reported that 3% of all
services provided by its affiliates in 2007 were abortions. Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., Planned Parenthood Services, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/issues(last visited May 6,
action/birth-control/teen-pregnancy/reports/pp-services-17317.htm
2009). In comparison, of the services rendered in 2007, 36% were contraceptive related, 31%
dealt with sexually transmitted disease testing, and 17% pertained to cancer screening and
prevention. Id.
178. See Ruth Holladay, Planned ParenthoodPartnershipa Good Match, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June
20, 2006, at Bi (reporting that "Independent Adoption Centers will have a presence at a
Planned Parenthood of Indiana clinic two or three times a week").
179. Compare Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Am I Pregnant?, http://www.ppin.org/
pregnant.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009) (listing three locations that provide adoption
services: Indianapolis, Bloomington, and Merrillville), with Planned Parenthood of Indiana,
Abortion Services, http://www.ppin.org/abservices.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009) (listing
the same three locations as the locations that provide abortion services).
i8o. Betty Cockrum, Women's Health Is Focus ofAgency, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Nov. 5,
2007, at Ali.
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introduction of a legislative package to protect access to contraception and
medically accurate sexuality education."' The need in Indiana is particularly
stark: in one study, Indiana ranked forty-ninth among the states in meeting
the need for contraceptive services.s2
Certainly, disagreements over precisely how best to reduce the number of
abortions will remain, even beyond the most controversial issues of abortion
restrictions themselves. Perhaps the greatest challenge for a common-ground
agenda will be how to handle the issue of sexuality education and, more
generally, the promotion of safe and responsible sexual practices that help
prevent unintended pregnancies, all while respecting differences of perspective
all along the ideological spectrum."s3 One important consideration is the
overwhelming public support for medically accurate, age-appropriate, and
comprehensive sexuality education that includes (but is not limited to)
promoting abstinence. 8 4 Another challenge will be to incorporate across the
political spectrum a genuine commitment to empowering women to bear
chosen and healthy babies through a range of social programs, from health care
to childcare to domestic violence protections. Notwithstanding inevitable
differences, shifting coalitions will have a far greater ability to find common
ground if all strive to be sensitive to the moral dimensions of the issues and to
take care not to demean sincerely held, principled religious and moral views.
If common-ground approaches require honest debate about real
differences, then that is to be welcomed. TRAP laws that make abortion
services more expensive and difficult to obtain without countervailing health
benefits, in contrast, are at best a misguided and harmful response to
legitimate moral concerns about abortion, and at worst a tactical effort to close
down clinics under the guise of protecting women's health. The burdens of this

181. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Prevention First Legislation, http://advocates.ppin.org/
prev firstlegislation.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009).
GUTrMACHER
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COUNTS:
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(20o6),

available at

http ://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/statedata/states/indiana.pdf.
183.

184.

See Salmon, supra note 18 (reporting that the recent coalition of abortion proponents and
opponents who are advocating for legislation to "provide pregnant women with health care,
child care, and money for education" have purposefully avoided "more sensitive aspects of
the issue, such as laws that restrict abortion, contraception, sex education and abstinenceonly programs" in order to "preserve the coalition").
See, e.g., Amy Bleakley, Michael Hennessy & Martin Fishbein, Public Opinion on Sex
Education in U.S. Schools, 16o ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1151, 1154 (2006)
(reporting that 82% of its nationally representative sample supported the teaching of
"abstinence plus" sexuality education, which teaches abstinence in addition to information
on contraception and how to prevent sexually transmitted diseases, while 36% supported
"abstinence only" education).
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flawed strategy fall disproportionately on women with the fewest economic
and other means to navigate them. Common-ground approaches would seek to
build practical, responsible policies on a shared goal of reducing abortions
while protecting the liberty and equality interests of women and their families.

